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Turks on their own account, and also have an occasional brush with the Austrians, to whom, on account of their predatory habits and republican principles, they are very troublesome neighbors.

Sir Gardner Wilkinson gives an amusing account of his excursions in Montenegro, where he was received with much courtesy by the Vladika, and by the common people with as much hospitality as their circumstances permitted. But we cannot follow him in his wanderings, having already bestowed as much space upon his book as our limits will permit. His volumes, on the whole, afford more materials for grave study and meditation than for the entertainment of the passing hour, so that the lovers of very light reading will be apt to pass them by altogether. But he writes without prejudice or pretension, and throws considerable light upon what has recently become a political problem of no small moment,—the condition, tendencies, and prospects of the great Slavonic race in Europe.

ART. V. — 1. *The Pre-Adamite Earth*. By JOHN HARRIS, D. D., President of Cheshunt College, Author of the "Great Teacher," "Great Commission," "Mammon," etc. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1847. 12mo. pp. 294.

2. *Man Primeval: or, the Constitution and Primitive Condition of the Human Being*. By JOHN HARRIS, D. D. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1849. 12mo. pp. 480.

THESE volumes are on *a priori* cosmogony and anthropogony, and are the first volumes of a series of *a priori* constructions, among which are to be a treatise on domestic, and one on political economy, a gospel, and a sketch of the ultimate earthly destiny of humanity. The author is a fervently religious, and a sufficiently (though we see no reason for saying a profoundly) learned man. We are inclined to think that his true province is that of parænetic theology; and though his style has always been too diffuse to suit our taste,

we have assigned to him a high rank among the influential minds of the age. His success in this department has doubtless tempted him to go beyond it ; and with an evident rectitude and loftiness of purpose, and with express design to neutralize the impression made by the "*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*," he has addressed himself to the solution of this problem : — *Given the divine attributes, to determine the essential laws, the successive processes, the design and the destiny, of the physical and spiritual universe.* We propose to examine the validity of this mode of inquiry.

In the first place, if we suppose its results complete, definite, and satisfactory in the highest degree, it gives us merely the complementary arc of an argumentative circle. For how know we the attributes of God? Manifestly by means of the universe, which they have created, and still pervade and sustain. In saying this, we do not overlook the office of revelation. On the other hand, we thankfully acknowledge that the God whom we worship could not have become known to us, except through the teachings and character of Him whom we revere as "God manifest in the flesh," — the express image of the Invisible and the Eternal. But Christianity rests on the basis of natural religion. It volunteers no proof of the divine omnipresence or omniscience ; but refers us to "the things that are made" for the evidence of the "eternal power and Godhead" of the Creator. It assumes the existence of God and his *physical* attributes, by which term we denote those which are essential to his self-existence, — those without which God could not be. Yet more, it assumes his justice and his benevolence ; and its disclosures of immortality, retribution, and pardon, momentous as they are, are, philosophically speaking, mere specifications under those heads. Without the observed facts and the thence derived principles of natural theology, faith in revealed religion would be impossible. It is because the divine goodness is manifested around us in forms and ways without number, that we can lend our ready credence to those scriptural representations, which extend the reign of omnipotent love to a higher sphere of human existence. It is because, in the visible administration of the universe, virtue on the whole has greatly the advantage over vice, that we hesitate not to accept the dogma of a perfect retribution in the future state. It is because reliefs, remedies,

and cures abound in the system and course of nature, that, prior to the promulgation of Christianity, there was so much vague trust, and that, under Christian culture, there is so much intelligent and assured confidence, in the forgiveness of sin. We beg not to be misunderstood. We yield to none in our sense of the need and worth of miraculous attestation to the truths of religion ; nor can there be any law or fact in the actual universe of God, which could not thus be made certain. But we can imagine things which miracles could not prove. Were the world as full of the tokens of divine malignity as it is of the traces of divine benevolence, no array of miraculous testimony could authenticate such a religion as Christianity. Were the world devoid of the marks of design, and filled with the manifest dice-work of irresponsible chance, a miraculous revelation could convey no satisfying or coherent religious knowledge. Consistency with what we already know is an essential law of belief, — a law which it is impossible that the divine veracity should supersede, and which our own minds can never escape. But if our knowledge of natural, and our faith in revealed, religion depend upon the structure, laws, and phenomena of the universe, *a priori* reasoning with regard to the universe is not reasoning, but simple verification. In this last form, it may be instructive and edifying, — in the form of argument, it is fallacious and worthless ; for its premises depend upon its conclusions.

It is implied in what we have said, that this *a priori* reasoning can develop no new truth, — can add nothing to our knowledge. It is essentially a syllogistic process. It resolves itself into the following logical statement : — “ The universe that God has made must bear such and such marks of his attributes. The universe with which we are conversant bears these marks. Therefore God has created it.” But the only question at issue is, not whether God made the universe, but whether there is a God. This question can be answered only by reasoning *a posteriori*, — by going down to the marks of benevolent design which the creation presents, and rising thence to the conception of an intelligent and benevolent Creator. This, as regards our knowledge, is a constructive process. Inductive reasoning reveals truth. Every successive generalization is a fact of its own order. We pass from the phenomena of the visible universe, first, to the idea of

benevolent design, and then, through our own consciousness as moral agents, to the existence of a God endowed with intellectual and moral attributes corresponding to the obvious characteristics impressed upon the outward universe.

A priori deductions, as to what the universe must needs be, are either specific or general. If specific, they imply on the part of the reasoner wisdom coëxtensive with that of the Supreme Artificer. He, who is qualified to pronounce definitely what *must be* the succession and the mode of the divine manifestations, is fit to take the place of the Creator, and might, if he only had space and power, construct a universe of his own as perfect as that which God has made. But the very admission of the infinite wisdom of the Divine Being leaves room for the supposition that he may have designs and ends beyond human ken, and that among the purposes embodied in his creation there may be some not yet so far developed as to come within the cognizance of a finite mind. The reasoner *a posteriori* may admit the existence of mysterious laws and phenomena, and yet his inductions, if they embrace a sufficient number of known facts, are sound and valid; while the *a priori* reasoner, taking the entire attributes of God as the basis of his argument, professes to have the key for the solution of all mysteries.

Deductions of this sort also, so far as they are positive and specific, beg in the negative the question of the Creator's freedom. Necessity in some form must be the parent of an universe that admits of an *a priori* projection. Either the laws of nature must have a sanction and validity prior to, and independent of, the will of the Creator, so that he is rather their subject than their author; or else his resources are so far limited that he had not the choice between two or more equally glorious and beneficent plans of self-manifestation. In the former case, we abut upon the anti-Christian theories of a plastic nature and the eternity of matter, and divide the attribute of omnipotence between him whom we call the Almighty and some metaphysical abstraction of our own fancies; in the latter, we make an assumption equally arrogant in regard to Him whose essence transcends the legitimate field of our speculations, and unauthorized by the analogy of our own moral experience. Indeed, the idea that there can be but one best way belongs to the very numerous

class of fallacies, growing out of the transfer of mathematical principles to the department of ontology and ethics. There is a *maximum* among the chords of a circle, among surfaces of the same perimeter, among solids of the same superficial extent. But there is not necessarily in every case an *optimum* among possible courses of moral conduct. Philanthropy may be equally well directed in either of several different channels of effort. The same worthy end may often be reached through a wide diversity of routes. Very different plans of life might be chosen by the same individual with equal fitness, and be pursued with equally pure motives and lofty principles. And if we are authorized to apply to the conduct of the Divine Being any analogies founded on our limited knowledge, it must be those derived from that moral and spiritual life which is kindled from his own, rather than from the laws of space and dimension. That we cannot conceive of any change in the system of things except for the worse, by no means proves that system the *only best* that God could have made; for parts are so adapted to parts, and means to ends, that there could be no substitution of some details for others without marring the symmetry and violating the harmony of the whole. But we can conceive that the power, wisdom, and benevolence of the Creator might have been as fully manifested in an altogether different system, as in the present order of nature.

These *a priori* deductions must, then, be general in order to be valid. They cannot extend to physical laws and arrangements; but, when they seem to cover this ground, they must be the axioms of religious knowledge translated into the language of physical science. In their only unexceptionable form, they are the merest truisms. Thus, for instance, the *a priori* law, formally announced by our author, that "every object and event in the material universe will be found to be variously related," is simply a somewhat obscure statement of the divine unity; and the law that "every thing belonging to the great system of creation will be found either promoting, or existing under an obligation to promote, the great end, commensurate with its means and relations," implies neither more nor less than that God can make nothing in vain. Now, if one prefers stating religious truths in these inverted and involved forms, we find no fault with his taste.

But the writer who pursues this course is looking the wrong way. What we most need is to have our regards fixed upon the Creator through his works, — the process of investigation, in which the face is turned towards, and the attention riveted upon, the outward universe, ministers very indirectly to the spirit of reverence and adoration.

The treatises before us in part evade criticism by their Protean character. In their details, they often seem to assume the theory of an *only best*; and with regard to many physical laws and arrangements, which it seems to us more reverent to treat as contingent, the author's language literally implies that they could not have been otherwise. Yet the fundamental laws of the divine action, on which these treatises are based, are, all of them, awkwardly enunciated truisms, such as, for aught we can see to the contrary, might have been equally verified in an universe which had not a single physical characteristic in common with that which actually exists. That this is the case, our author admits in several fundamental portions of the theory of the universe. Thus, he evidently leans very strongly (and as we are inclined to say, especially in connection with the rapid progress made in the resolution of the nebulæ, very absurdly) towards La Place's nebular hypothesis; and frequently reminds us that his fundamental laws are equally verified in this hypothesis and in the ordinary theory of creation. But wherever his convictions are strong and earnest, his fundamental laws become imperative in their requisitions. Thus, on antecedent grounds, he denounces the doctrines of modern phrenology as impossible. We agree with him in denying them; but we cannot see how or why they are absolutely untenable, *salvâ fide*. We can conceive of their truth in entire consistency with the fundamental dogmas of natural and revealed religion; and reject them only because the inductive evidence in their favor is insufficient to render them probable.

Anthropomorphism is an inherent error and an inevitable danger connected with investigations like those under review. The *a priori* world-maker takes God's point of sight, and yet ceases not to be a man. He views all objects through the partial media, and under the necessary limitations, of human vision. He contemplates the attributes of the Deity, not simultaneously, but successively. These defects are no

blot on his representations of physical or scientific truth, so long as he reverently confesses, "Lo, these are parts of his ways; but how little a portion is heard of him!" But when he assumes a central position, and professes to give us a symmetrical view of the vast whole, he can hardly fail to ascribe to the Creator much that belongs only to the dimness and finiteness of his own conceptions. For marks of this tendency we might refer our readers to these volumes *passim*; and though in language they are generally well guarded, we occasionally meet with phraseology bordering upon irreverence; as when the author speaks of one system's "furnishing an inconceivably severer test of Divine all-sufficiency" than another.

Dr. Harris's whole system is founded upon an anthropomorphic theory. The divine attributes are revealed in a certain succession to human knowledge, and are presented to our conceptions according to that same order. Power, wisdom, love, holiness, mercy, form the series in which they spontaneously arrange themselves in thought and language. Therefore, says our author, they must needs have manifested themselves in the creation in this precise order, and each of the series must have had its era of exhibition before the next succeeding played a prominent part in the great drama. We are indeed told that no attribute of God can have been absolutely dormant; but are given to understand that, at successive stages of creation, all but one, all but two, or all but three would have seemed otiose to a spectator. Power was the attribute which necessarily came first in the order of manifestation. We are assured that no class of spiritual existences can have preceded the material universe. Angels there were not, when the heavens and the earth were made; for their existence would have presupposed the development in a plastic form of the divine love and holiness, and "*our principles* require, that, whatever the rank of the angelic order may be, the process of the Divine manifestation to it observes the same order it does to man." The primeval act of creation, then, either called into existence a nebular mass, from which suns, systems, and worlds were gradually enucleated, or else the separate bodies which we now call planets and stars. For ages after their creation or separate existence, these bodies were the scene of conflict, fermentation, and

combination among the elementary atoms, under the brute laws of gravitation, chemical affinity, and crystallization. Thus were the waters and the rocks elaborated. Thus were the massive features of this world, and of all worlds, carved in rough. Thus were the primitive strata of our globe deposited and indurated. Thus was shaped and consolidated an universe, so entirely blank as regarded marks of design, that a finite spectator would have beheld in it no intellectual or moral attribute of the Deity, but would have regarded it as the purposeless mirror of omnipotence.

When these ages of power had completed their cycle, wisdom entered upon the field of creation in the forms of organized, but non-sentient being. To be sure, some animal remains are found, we are told, in the lowest fossiliferous strata, and how they came to be thus misplaced we are not informed. But in fact, vegetable formations predominate in the earliest rocks, and of right they ought to occupy unrivalled the lowest place. It is not, indeed, easy to trace in the fossil Flora a regular and uninterrupted progress from the lower to the higher forms of vegetable life; for the soft and destructible nature of plants has obliterated much of the evidence of this sort, which must have existed some thousands of centuries ago. But divine wisdom must needs have proceeded tentatively, from the ferns and cryptogamous orders to plants of more complex structure and more manifold potential utilities. In the fossil botany of our planet, our author traces, and we think on sufficient grounds, three successive eras, — the first marked by the predominance of the cryptogamous forms, — the second by certain genera, many of them now extinct, of the Cycadeæ, Coniferæ, and Liliaceæ, — the third by the prevalence of most of the orders with which we are now conversant.

During this period, the Divine benevolence was developed only in that eternal purpose, in which the whole future must have been forever present. It now embodies itself in the third great epoch, that of animal and sentient existence, — in the creation of beings capable of enjoyment, but not the subjects of law, responsibility, or moral agency. Here, again, there are some links wanting, and some misplaced in the series of geological testimony; and our author is not very clear as to the principle of progression in this department. He is satisfied, however, (and with reason,) that in advancing

from the earlier to the later strata, there is a graduated increase in the number of species found in a fossil state ; that among the vertebrated classes the geological order is that of an ascending series, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals ; and that there is a gradual progress from the prevalence of extinct to that of existing species.

The time had now arrived for the manifestation of the Divine holiness. The pristine act of creation is that indicated in the first chapter of Genesis,—"In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." The eras already described transpired in the interval left by the sacred historian between the first and the second verse. Prior to the introduction of man upon the stage, the earth was thrown by some awful convulsion into a virtually chaotic state, though with the records of prior creations imbedded in its submerged strata. At this period, the higher orders of the spiritual world were called into being, and the interlude before the next great act of creative energy was sufficiently long for some of them to have fallen from their lofty estate, to have peopled pandemonium, and to have prepared a Tempter through whose agency human virtue might be put to the test. Then, within the space of six solar days, the earth and the visible universe assumed their present forms and relations ; the land was clothed with verdure and bloom ; the sky, field, and forest were stocked with the parent brood of our existing species of animals ; and man, subject to law, and capable of the highest moral development, was ushered into the home made ready for him. The attribute of mercy alone remained unmanifested ; for human guilt was needed as its background, and it was essential that holiness, in its form of strict legality, proclaimed amidst the thunders of Sinai, and inexorable in its requisition of perfect obedience, should have its age-long era of manifestation, before the fulness of time arrived for the advent of him who should adequately exhibit the forbearance and placability of the Almighty.

Now with this theory of creation, considered as the probable result of geological investigation, we can find no fault. We should differ from our author only in his interpretation of the Mosaic narrative, the days of which seem to us to correspond to successive geological epochs, so that, in our view, science and revelation lend each other mutual confirmation.

But we cannot admit an *a priori* necessity for this order. It rests on a postulate, which man can never verify in this world, namely, the non-existence of finite spirits prior to the last epoch of creation. To us, we confess, it seems more probable, that, though there may have been unnumbered ages during which this world had not a rational inhabitant, there were all the while realms of spiritual existence in which the entire circle of the divine attributes was fully manifested. We can find nothing intrinsically incredible in the common belief, that at the end of six natural days from the creation of brute matter, man walked in Eden. We should maintain this, did not geology constrain us to admit that the earth passed through many successive eras prior to the existence of man. Our objection to Chateaubriand's strange theory, that the earth was created old, and that the fossils in its lower strata are not the remains of plants or animals that ever lived, but marks of age imbedded in the solid rock by the Supreme Artificer, is, not that it interferes with any necessary order of manifestation, but that it is a virtual impeachment of the divine veracity, and a summary denial of the validity of all scientific reasoning. Nor can we believe that our author would have ever imagined the order which he presents to have been necessary, had he not been previously convinced of it as a fact resting on adequate inductive evidence. Creation must indeed have had a beginning, and God alone existed from eternity. But we are lost in our attempt to imagine the dread solitude of "Him who is from everlasting," and the moment when his creative fiat was launched into the infinite void. But so far as we can with reverence conceive of that plastic energy in its primeval goings forth, we can think only of the whole God as outtrayed and mirrored in the earliest forms of being.

We find it hard, also, to sympathize with our author in his dogmatic and positive statement of the ultimate purpose of creation, namely, "the manifestation of the divine all-sufficiency." This is anthropomorphism again. Selfish display is too often the law and end of man's creations. It is a purpose, which has written its history in blood. It has inspired the usurper, armed the conqueror, steeled the heart of the spoiler. It has chained myriads of slaves, to square the stones of the pyramids. It has hewn tombs in the solid rock, and

reared palaces and temples in the desert. It has left its monuments in godless literature, in poetry which fiends might chant on their gala-days. It is only when a higher aim has been conceived, when a holier purpose has nerved the arm, attuned the tongue, inspired the pen, that man has wrought works, performed deeds, left monuments, in which posterity can rejoice. Love, philanthropy, alone, has been the motive power of those whose names have won a dear and enduring place in the heart of humanity. But we would not substitute our own anthropomorphism for our author's. We presume not with our unconsecrated hands to lift the veil from the eternal purpose of the Almighty. It has been lifted for us by those to whom God has spoken. And if there be a truth of revelation, prominent before all others, pervading the record alike of prophet, evangelist, and apostle, it is that the ultimate purpose of creation was the exercise of the divine benevolence. The theory of infinite selfishness, which our author's language literally implies, keeps its place among written dogmas in the metaphysics of theology, mainly because nobody believes it, and it therefore has not been made a subject of controversy.

We have said these things, not in depreciation of Dr. Harris's book ; for allowing that such books need to be written, we should hardly expect to find less to censure than in these. But we do not believe that this is the way to study or to write natural theology. We prefer such geocentric views of the spiritual universe as we can take with accuracy, to heliocentric statements, in which imagination, inadequate conception, and fallible calculation must needs assume the place of observation. Paley's method has not yet been improved upon. The books before us comprehend a precious mass of materials for a treatise in that method, and, if so arranged, their details would present a rich series of proofs and illustrations of the divine attributes. In their present form, they are used to little purpose, and are chiefly valuable as independent facts and reasonings in physical science, rather than as the basis of a theological argument.

But while we doubt the utility of these treatises, we assign to the fundamental truths of natural and revealed religion an essential office in scientific reasoning. They are of service, however, rather in teaching us how to ask, than how to answer, questions. They show us in what direction the truth lies.

They furnish us with tests by which we may discriminate between the probable and the untenable, and may thus, even when in doubt or error, be redeemed from absurdity. They define limits within which correct theories must needs be found, — conditions which a hypothesis must satisfy in order to proffer valid claims upon our acceptance. By these means, the labor of inquiry is greatly abridged, and the progress of discovery greatly expedited. The routes of scientific research are not parallel, but cross and recross each other at frequent intervals; and there are three separate lines of investigation, at whose common points of intersection are found the fundamental truths of the physical universe.

On one of these routes the finger-post of design points the way. With inadequate views of the divine attributes, we should rest satisfied with the salient facts and *primâ facie* aspects of nature, and should readily admit the existence of purposeless and objectless forms and arrangements. The obliquity of the ecliptic would have been observed without being accounted for. Animals and plants would have been entered by name in the growing Fauna or Flora of the naturalist, without any attempt to assign them their place or office in the economy of creation. Human anatomy or physiology might have been complete in its details, and yet, as to its *rationale*, have remained in primeval rudeness. But the same mental process, which recognizes the wisdom of the Creator, dictates the axiom that nothing is made in vain, that all things exist for their several offices and subserve their respective ends. Science then no longer confines itself to the completion of its catalogue of existences and phenomena; but suspends the collection of facts to make entries on the parallel column of purposes and adaptations.

The second route is indicated by the divine benevolence. Under any system but that of Christian theism, science would make only few and casual aggressions upon the domain of apparent evil. Malignant would seem as probable as beneficent ends; and, where the immediate and conspicuous effect was disastrous, the law of design would suggest inquiry simply as to the adaptations and contrivances with reference to that disastrous result. Thus, the volcano, the earthquake, the thunderbolt, would be investigated only as to their resources of destruction, their desolating forces, their potency

as ministers of divine wrath and vengeance. But love strikes a new key-note in the harmonies of science. The Christian philosopher grapples with the seeming fiend, till he can strip off the mask that hides an angel's countenance. The fearful energies of nature are forced into the alembic, and tortured by successive tests, till they betray their benignant secret, and are exalted to their due place among beneficent agencies. The volcano thus becomes a safety-valve, the lightning a swift-winged minister of health.

The third of these routes has over its gateway the inscription, **GOD IS ONE**. Polytheistic science contented itself with thinly peopled groups and imperfect classifications. It traced resemblances of the lowest order, but hardly possessed the idea of analogy. Class was deemed distinct from class; the several kingdoms of nature were regarded as mutually independent; and sameness of plan in different departments was not so much as dreamed of. Analogy is but a comprehensive name for the filaments of divine oneness, which form the warp with which the ever-varying woof of creation is interwoven. Every argument from analogy is an enthymeme of which the unity of God is the suppressed member. Analogy indeed proves nothing; but it always points in the direction of the truth, suggests probabilities, solves doubts, affiliates insulated facts, and urges on the discovery of more extended inductions, higher generalizations, laws of simpler expression and wider embrace. It carries into the circuits of the stars the force that detaches the apple from its stem. It traces the commingling of the world-elements in the manipulations of the laboratory. It brings into the same system the elephant and the animalcule, the banyan that shelters an army, and the speck of mould on the crumbling wall. Impatient of differences and numbers, it ever blends, harmonizes, unites; nor can it lay down its ministry till it has inscribed on the entire creation the same clear record of the divine unity that stands on the page of revelation. Design, benevolence, unity, — these have become the watchwords of science, the conditions of probability, the germs of theories, the ultimate elements of human knowledge. But potent as these ideas are as the implements of discovery and means of progress, their office is not construction, but verification. They do not tell us what we shall find on inquiry, but only where, and on

what conditions we shall find it. They furnish not the terms of available *a priori* reasoning ; but only enable us to substantiate our inductions of facts, and to pass step-wise, by observation and experiment, from lower to higher orders of truths.

After what we have said, it can hardly be needful that we give a detailed analysis or criticism of the books before us. Perhaps our *a priori* objections to their form have blinded us to some of their merits. We have admitted for them the highest and most benevolent purposes on the part of the author. We admire the truly devout spirit in which they are written. They are the fruits, if not of a thorough education, at least of extended and judicious reading in the numerous departments of science which they cover. They contain a large amount of accurate and valuable knowledge, and elaborate discussions on not a few mooted points especially in human physiology and mental science. They embody hardly a conclusion from which we would dissent. They are to a surprising degree free from the marks of sectarian theology, and are utterly devoid of the traces of sectarian exclusiveness and rancor. But at best they are dull books, indirect, involved, and awkward in style, repetitious and prosy to an almost inconceivable degree, and entirely unrelieved either by natural eloquence or rhetorical artifice. They will be bought, no doubt, on credit of the author's reputation. They are so arranged that they may be summarily read by titles, as long bills are before Congress. But where they are read through, there must be either a dearth of books, a singularly persistent confidence in a distinguished name, or a reviewer as conscientious as we profess to be.

The proverb, *ne sutor supra crepidam*, has grown obsolete. It is a heresy of our times, that he who has done one thing well is capable of every thing. The partitions between the different compartments of the field of intellectual labor are thrown down, and the whole ground is turned into common,—the surest way of making it waste land. But if a man has really won fame, or made himself singularly useful as a writer in any one department, the probable inference is, that his endowments and attainments fit him so well for that department, that he must meet with very partial success in any other. The training of such a writer as Dr. Harris

poorly qualifies him to grapple with the nice distinctions of science, to use technical terms with precision, and to present geological and physiological theories in a form in which they can be easily apprehended and retained by the uninitiated reader. His master-pieces, *Mammon*, and the *Great Teacher*, are excellent in their way, — grave, pungent, earnest, manifestly heartfelt appeals to the Christian public in behalf of fundamental, but sadly slighted, duties of the religious life. On that field we shall be glad to welcome him again ; but of the *Pre-Adamite Earth* and *Man Primeval*, though we have had them on our table for six months, and read them in easy instalments, we take our leave with, “ *Ohe ! jam satis est.* ”

ART. VI. — *History of the Siege of Boston, and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill ; also, an Account of the Bunker Hill Monument, with Illustrative Documents.* By RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, JR., Author of a *History of Charlestown*. Boston : Little & Brown. 1849. 8vo. pp. 420.

THE American Revolution is now an old story, and it has been often told. The names of the chief actors in it, and of the principal localities which it rendered memorable, together with some idea of its causes, progress, and issue, are as familiar to us as a nursery song. They were among the first teachings of our childhood, and have furnished ample food for the meditations of our riper years. But old as it is, the story has not yet become stale or wearisome, and we have thus far hardly spelt out a tithe of the instruction which it is able to afford. Passages of history require to be known with greater or less minuteness according as the events narrated in them have exerted more or less influence upon the character and fortunes of posterity, according as this influence has been lasting or ephemeral, and broad or limited in its sphere of operation. The immediate aspect of these events in the eyes of those who were contemporaneous with them is comparatively of little moment. They may have dazzled or astonished the bystanders from the number of the actors who were